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1. Introduction




1 In trodu ction
The Japanese modem company system was introduced after the 
establishment of the first modem govemment in 1867. In 1899, the 
systematic Commercial Code, an important part of which was com­
pany law, was enacted. Although the drafters of the Commercial 
Code studied mainly the model of the Germán company law system, 
somé important deviations were thought to be necessary. Fór exam- 
ple, the organ of the board of supervisors (Aufsichtsrat) that was 
authorized to appoint and remove managing directors (Vorstand) 
was, in the drafters’ view, nőt appropriate fór Japanese companies 
that were in the first stage of development. Instead of the board of 
supervisors, the organ of the statutory auditor was introduced, bút 
it was authorized only to audit management and accounting with- 
out being authorized to appoint or remove directors. Managing 
directors, therefore, had very strong influence. Statutory auditors 
could nőt function as eflectively as the legislators had envisioned. 
The statutory auditor was said to be to the system what an, organ 
like an „appendix" is to a humán body.
The Japanese company law experienced revolutionary reform 
under the reign of occupation forces after the Second World War as 
a part of full-scale reforms conceming Japanese economic and 
social systems. The United States took a leadership role in the 
reforms via the involvement of occupation forces. In the field of 
company law, the elements of American company law were intro-
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duced, such as a board of directors, non-par value stock, or author- 
ized Capital system etc. As such American elements were grafted intő 
a traditional company law similar to those of civil law countries, the 
Japanese company law developed unique characteristics from the 
viewpoint of comparative law.
In the economic growth period after the World War, the compa­
ny law was amended quite often and, as a result, its uniqueness has 
been further broadened. Individual provisions of the Commercial 
Code became so complicated that it has become apparently very dif- 
ficult fór foreigners to understand Japanese company law correctly 
from translations of it.
Furthermore, the company law has been amended repeatedly in 
recent years in attempts to revitalize the Japanese economy now 
mired in deep depression. The amendments, such as those concern- 
ing the deregulation of stock repurchases, introduction of stock 
options, introduction of exchange of shares and division of a com­
pany are intended to make it easier fór Japanese companies to 
restructure their businesses. On the other hand, the Japanese Sys­
tem o f corporate govemance has been criticized recently, and 
reform efforts are now underway both practically and legislatively. 
Fór those purposes, the company law was amended three times 
during 2001, and furthermore amended alsó in 2002. As a result, it 
is very difficult even fór Japanese company lawyers to completely 
understand existing law.
In this report, major characteristics of Japanese company law, 
particularly the stock company law, including recent amendments, 
are shortly summarized.
2  Types o f  com pan ies
Four types of companies can be formed under the law: partnership, 
limited partnership, limited liability company (priváté company)1 
and stock company. Under the Japanese Commercial Code, partner- 
ships and limited partnerships are incorporated entities.2 As a 
result, the selection of company type is nőt impactful from a taxa- 
tion point of view. A partnership or limited partnership is rarely 
selected. Limited liability companies or stock companies, in which 
members can limit their liabilities against creditors of a company to
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the amount of their contribution to the paid-in Capital, are usually 
the selected organizational models. There are about 1.3 millión 
limited liability companies and about 1 millión stock companies. Fór 
small businesses, the limited liability company is appropriate in the- 
ory. However, in Japan, the stock company form is öltén selected 
even by very small businesses. The requirement of minimum paid- 
in Capital (Yen 10,00,000) fór a stock company was introduced in 
1997.3 Until then there was no requirement fór minimum paid-in 
Capital, and use of the stock company form fór small businesses was 
widespread. There are just 3,500 stock companies whose stocks are 
listed in stock exchanges or traded in the over-the-counter markét. 
Most other stock companies are closed-held companies.
The variety of stock companies makes it necessary to classify 
them intő categories and to build rules that are appropriate to each 
category of companies. There are somé different standards fór clas- 
sification of stock companies under the Commercial Code and other 
special legislation.
(i) C lassification  by s ize  o f  business
Stock companies are classified intő three categories; i.e. large com­
pany, medium-sized company and small company, as measured by 
their paid-in Capital or by their balance sheet liabilities. A company 
whose paid-in Capital is, more than Yen 500 millión or whose liabil­
ities are more than Yen 20,000 millión (Yen 20 billión) is consi- 
dered a large company.4 Financial statements of a large company 
shall be audited by certified public accountant.5 A medium-sized 
company and a small company audit by a certified public accoun­
tant are nőt obligatory, and financial statements have to be audited 
only by the statutory auditor. Fór a large company, there are alsó 
special provisions fór statutory auditors and a generál meeting. A 
company whose paid-in Capital is less than Yen 100 millión is con- 
sidered a small company.6 In a small company, an auditor is author- 
ized to audit just financial statements and nőt to audit the actual 
management of directors.7 All companies other than large compa­
nies or small companies are considered medium-sized.
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( ii)  C lassifica tion  by tran sferab ility  o fs to ck s
As in a closely-held company, restriction of the transferability of 
stocks is desirable, and the articles of incorporation may restrict 
such transfers.8 Owing to this restriction, approval by the board of 
directors is necessary fór such transfer of stocks. The board of direc- 
tors can refuse approval even without any reasonable reason, bút in 
case of refusal, it must designate another transferee who is accept- 
able to the company, or itself purchase the stocks to be transferred.9 
Thus, the transferor can recover his investment. There are a lót of 
individual provisions in the Commercial Code that are applicable to 
just such companies the transferability of whose stocks are restric- 
ted. (Such a company is called a transfer-restricted company in the 
following parts.) Fór example, stockholders do nőt generally have 
preemptive rights under the Commercial Code, bút stockholders of 
a transfer-restricted company have such preemptive rights.10
( ii i)  P u b lic  com pany a n d  closely-held com pany
There are somé individual provisions in the Commercial Code that 
are applicable just to companies whose stocks are listed on the 
stock exchanges or registered on the over-the-counter markets. 
(Such companies are called public in the following parts.) Fór exam­
ple, a public company is able to purchase its own stocks on stock 
exchanges or over-the-counter markets.11 On the contrary, a non- 
public company must provide equal opportunities to all stockhol­
ders to sell their stocks to a company from the viewpoint o f the 
equal treatment of stockholders who could nőt sell stocks in the 
markét.12
The Securities Trading Act is alsó applicable to public compa­
nies. The Securities Trading Act’s model was the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchanges Act of 1934 in United States. The 
Securities Trading Act provides fór the disclosure system of public 
companies that consists of both disclosure at the public issuance of 
securities and continuous disclosure via annual fmancial state- 
ments, etc. The Commercial Code regulates accounting and disclo­
sure o f financial statements just as company laws in most European
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countries do, bút it is nőt adequate fór public companies. This rea- 
son necessitates stricter regulation by The Securities Trading Act.
3 C orporate Fináncé
(1) S ize  o f  stock
Until the enactment of an amendment in 2001, a stock company 
could issue pár value stocks and/or non-par value stocks. In prac- 
tice, the non-par value stocks were very rare. As under the 
Commercial Code, the minimum pár value was Yen 50,000 at the 
incoporation stage, and the minimum issue price of pár value stock 
at that stage was alsó Yen 50,000. Furthermore, non-par value 
stocks could nőt be issued at a lower price than Yen 50,000 at incor- 
poration. Altér incoporation, there were no restrictions on the pár 
value and issure price. However, a stock split as prohibited if after 
the split the amount of net assets per one stock came to belower 
than Yen 50,000. Thus, the value of a stock was heavily regulated by 
the Commercial Code, and it was larger than the typical value of a 
stock in other major countries. The legislature thought that too 
small a size triggered disproportionately high costs in administra- 
tion of stockholders in comparison with the substantial value of 
stockholders’ investments.
The minimum pár value and issue price were raised from Yen 50 
to Yen 50,000 by amendment in 1981. The pár value of the stocks 
of the companies that had been incorporated until then was usual- 
ly Yen 50. Therefore, the 1981 amendment means that one thou- 
sand stocks must be merged intő one stock (reverse stock split, 
stock split-down). Bút it was impossible in practice to realize such a 
stock split-down, because it necessitated the exchange of stock cer- 
tificates of outstanding stocks fór new certificates. The legislature 
introduced, as a temporary measure, the unit-stocks system. Under 
this system, a stock company was nőt forced to split-down its stock, 
and could give voting rights and other govemance participatation 
rights only to stockholders who held more than one thousand 
stocks. One thousand stocks constitute'd „one unit of stocks.” The 
unit-stocks system was maintained until the passing of an amend­
ment in 2001. The legislature thought that too small a size triggered
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disproportionately high costs in adminstration of stockholders in 
comparison with the substantial value of stockholders’ investments.
By the amendment in 2001, the pár value stock rule was abo- 
lished, and regulation on the size of a stock was alsó abolished 
simültaneously. The markét price of companies in the fields of IT- 
related businesses skyrocketed somé years ago in Japan. Such com­
panies planned stock splits in order to facilitate easier investment by 
public, bút stock splits were impossible by reason of the regulation 
as mentioned above because such companies did nőt have sufficient 
net assets and markét prices skyrocketed only by reason of expected 
future earnings. This phenomenon caused the legislature to abolish 
the regulation on the size of stocks. By the abolition of pár value 
stocks, all stocks of Japanese companies are now non-par value. 
There are no longer restrictions on issue price and stock splits. The 
unit-stocks system has been transformed intő a perpetual System by 
the 2001 amendment.13
(2) C lasses o f  stocks
A stock company can issue classes of stocks. Before the amendments 
in 2001 and 2002, classes of stocks were strictly regulated by the 
Commercial Code. As classes of stocks, only preferred /common/ 
deferred stocks, convertible stocks, redeemable stocks were permit- 
ted. Only preferred stocks could be non-voting stocks. If preferred 
dividends were nőt paid continuously, the preferred non-voting 
stockholders were able to exercise voting rights. Outstanding non- 
voting stocks could nőt exceed one third of all outstanding stocks. 
The rights of any eláss o f stockholders had to be provided fór by the 
articles o f incorporation. Only the amount of preferred dividend 
could be decided by the board of directors at the time of issue with- 
in the highest rangé provided fór by the articles of incorporation.
With the amendments in 2001 and 2002, the regulations on 
classes o f stocks have been relaxed to a large extent. In addition to 
existing classes, restricted voting stocks and stocks that allow elec- 
tion of a specific number of directors have been introduced. 
Restricted voting stocks include non-voting stocks, stocks to which 
voting rights are attached just fór specific corporate matters, or 
stocks to which voting rights are nőt attached to specific corporate
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matters.14 Other types of restricted voting stocks may be designed 
by the articles of incorporation. Restriction of voting rights and pre- 
ference of dividends must nőt be linked. Non-voting common 
stocks can be issued under the amended Commercial Code. 
However, outstanding restricted voting stocks cannot exceed half of 
all outstanding stocks.15 Super voting stock or similar stock to 
which plural voting rights are attached is prohibited by reason that 
such stock may prejudice faimess in the control of a company. 
Stocks that allow election of a specific number of directors may be 
available only fór a transfer-restricted company.16 A refusal right 
may be attached to any eláss of stocks.17
Deregulation of classes of stocks relating to voting rights means 
that autonomy as provided fór in the articles of incorporation has 
been dramatically strengthened. As long as the articles of incorpora­
tion are drafted prudently, stock companies can issue a variety of 
classes of stocks that have appeal fór a wide rangé of investors. 
Autonomy as concems the articles of Corporation is indispensable, 
particularly in closely-held companies such as joint ventures or ven- 
ture business companies. However, the refusal right of any eláss of 
stockholders may cause deadlock. While the articles of incorpora­
tion should provide, in advance, a solution that can end such dead­
lock, the Commercial Code itself permits a compulsory conversion 
clause in such articles that enables the company to convert any eláss 
of stocks intő other classes of stock such as common stocks.18
Alsó reguládon of classes of stocks conceming dividends has 
been relaxed and autonomy, as defined by the articles of incorpora­
tion, has been broadened. This deregulation makes possible track- 
ing stocks. With tracking stocks, dividends are closely correlated 
with the eamings of a specific subsidiary or of a specific segment of 
business. Fór such types of stocks, complicated provisions on divi­
dends and other matters are necessary, bút the articles of incorpo­
ration may provide only an outline of essential matters or guidelines 
on dividends.19
Tracking stocks are useful tools fór equity financing of stock 
companies, bút they present serious problems with regard to con- 
flicts of interest between classes of stockholders, as discussed in 
United States.
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(3) R a is in g  C apita l
Since the amendment in 1950, the so-called authorized stock Capi­
tal system has been provided fór in the Commercial Code as in 
American company law. Under this system, the board of directors is 
authorized to issue new stocks at any time within the authorization 
limit defined by the articles of incorporation, and a resolution of 
generál meeting is nőt necessary to do so.20 Only authorization to 
issue new stocks exceeding four times the number of outstanding 
stocks is prohibited.21 Existing, stockholders, except in transfer- 
restricted companies, do nőt have preemptive rights fór new stocks 
to be issued, unless they are given preemptive rights by a resolution 
of the board of directors or by a provision of the articles of incorpo­
ration. Under the authorized stock Capital system, the amount of 
paid-in Capital is nőt an item of the articles of incorporation. It is 
registered in the corporate registry.22
Under the authorized Capital system a controlling power of 
stockholders who do nőt have preemtive rights could be diluted by 
issue of new stocks. The Commercial Code gives priority to the 
interests of a company in its flexibility to raise Capital over the inte- 
rests of stockholders. However, the Commercial Code restricts the 
issue price in order to prevent dilution of equity value of existing 
stocks. If the issue price is lower than the markét price of existing 
stocks, the issuance of new stocks must be authorized by the special 
, resolution of a generál meeting.23 The directors must make public 
notice or give individual notice to stockholders on the issue price, 
number of issued new stocks and so on, unless existing stockhold­
ers are given preemptive rights.24 If informed stockholders consider 
the issuance unlawfiil or unfair, they can claim a court-issued 
injunctive order to enjoin the issue of new stocks.25
(4) S tock op tion
As the growth prospects of Japanese companies declined, they have 
become highly interested in stock options that give management or 
employees incentive to contribute to the eamings of their compa­
nies. With an amendment in 1997, stock options have been permit- 
ted under the Commercial Code. Unfortunately, as this amendment
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was realized by the leadership of the members of Parliament fór 
political motive, the amended Commercial Code were problematic 
from a practical point of view. Moreover, in 2000, the prohibition of 
a holding company system by the Anti-Monopoly Act was abolished 
and sómé major groups of companies have been restructured intő 
holding company groups. In such a holding company group struc- 
ture, stock options would be granted to directors or employees of 
all companies belonging to the group. Bút under the Commercial 
Code at that time, a stock company could grant stock options only 
to its own directors or employees. By amendment in 2001, the pro- 
visions on stock options were completely reformed.
The amended Commercial Code introduced generál provisions 
on stock option. The concept of stock option includes all types of 
options that enable holders of options to claim issue or tansfer óf 
stocks ffom the company.26 Nőt only stock options granted to ma- 
nagement or employees, bút alsó conversion rights of convertible 
bonds or warrants of bonds with warrants are stock options in the 
meaning of the Commercial Code, and they are fimdamentally sub- 
ject to the same reguládon. Stock options must be granted in 
exchange fór payment of fair value.27 The Black-Sholes option pric- 
ing model or similar models may be referred to fór valuation of fair 
value of stock options. The special resolution of the generál meet- 
ing is necessary to grant anybody stock options if granted without 
payment of fair value.28 On the other hand, the board of directors is 
authorized to grant stock options to anybody as long as the grantees 
of stock options pay fair value to the company, and there are no 
legal restrictions on the types of grantees.
Directors or employees are usually granted stock options with­
out payment of fair value. The Commercial Code does nőt consider 
the Services or labour supplied by directors or employees as consi- 
deration fór stock options. Therefore, a special resolution of the 
generál meeting is necessary to grant stock options to directors or 
employees. This reguládon seems to be excessive compared to reg- 
ulations in other countries, and a normál resolution by simple 
majority is sufficient.
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4 C orpora te  G ovem an ce
(1) E xisting  systern a n d  its reform
In Japan, an unique system of corporate govemance has been deve- 
loped. Directors who are elected by the generál meeting constitute 
the board of directors,29 and the board of directors elects the repre- 
sentative directors.30 The representative directors execu te business­
es affairs of the company, and the board of directors supervises the 
execution of the representative directors.31 Besides the board of 
directors, the statutory auditors, as an organ fór auditing, are 
appointed by the generál meeting.32 DifFering from the supervisory 
board (Aufsichtsrat) under the Germán company law, the statutory 
auditors are nőt authorized to elect directors, and are authorized 
only to audit the execution of business affairs by directors and, 
accounting.33 The audit of the execution of business affairs can 
cover only the legality o f execution, bút the efficiency of execution 
may nőt be so covered. In a large company, the statutory auditors 
constitute the board of statutory auditors,34 bút the power of indi- 
vidual statutory auditors and the board thereof has nőt been broa- 
dened.
Institutionally, the board of directors should supervise the exe­
cution of duties by representative directors form the viewpoint of 
legality and efficiency. The supervision by the board of directors is 
expected to function, backed by the power of the board of directors, 
by electing and removing the representative directors who hold the 
top management positions in the organizatiori. Bút the board of 
directors does nőt function as well in practice as was originally envi- 
sioned. The major reason is that directors are usually nominated 
from the ranks o f senior employees of the same company by the 
representative directors, and that most directors other than repre­
sentative directors are engaged in the execution of business affairs 
and are alsó incorporated intő the management orgánization of the 
company. Curiously, the lower classes of directors often hold the 
satus of director and senior employee concurrently. In other words, 
there are no very few independent outside directors in Japanese
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public companies. These practices make the supervisory role by the 
board of directors a nominal formality.
The statutory auditors are nőt authorized to supervise the effi- 
ciency of management by directors. The statutory auditors play an 
important role in legal compliance issues concerning directors and 
employees, bút they can nőt effectively prevent directors or emplo- 
yees írom engaging in illegal activities even in major companies. 
The reasons fór such phenomena are probably that the statutory 
auditors are usually nominated by the representative directors, and 
sufficient staff levels fór wide-ranging, comprehensive auditing are 
nőt provided.
Until the end of 1980s, when the Japanese economy enjoyed 
prosperity, the peculiar system of corporate govemance in Japanese 
companies was held in high esteem. Management by directors who 
are former employees can realize long-range interests of the compa­
ny, it was believed, and would alsó serve stockholder interests well. 
Certainly, with stock markét prices soaring continuously until the 
beginning of 1990s, stocks were the excellent investment vehicles, 
providing even less reason to question the conventional wisdom 
which prevailed at the time.
However, with the serious economic depression that has 
endured since the 1990s, the Japanese govemance system has been 
exposed to strong criticism. Japanese companies are criticized in 
the sense that management with a view to a long-range perspective 
sacrificed efficiencies in the process. Data on the average ROE of 
Japanese companies, being very low in intemational comparison, 
supports such a criticism. Alsó, illegal activities, even in major com­
panies, were nőt being prevented effectively.
Based upon such criticism, there prevailed a leading opinion 
that favoured reinforcement of the supervisory function of the 
board of directors. Such an opinion is strongly influenced by the 
American monitoring model of corporate govemance. Under the 
American monitoring mode, the majority of directors are outside 
directors, and alsó, the majority of the members of committees, 
such as audit committee, nominating committee or compensation 
committe, are outside directors. Those committees play key roles in 
supervision of the management practices of executive officers. Such
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a monitoring system is unacceptable to Japanese top management 
who consider the right to nominate directors as the source of per­
sona! leadership and power in one’s company. Evén the proposal 
that all large or public companies must have at least one outside 
director could nőt be adopted by reason of strong opposition of 
management organizations. As a compromise, the new alternate 
governance system was introduced by amendment in 2002. A large 
company is able to choose either the existing governance system or 
the new governance system.
(2) N ew  a lte m a tiv e  govern an ce system
It is practically difficult to impose compulsory election of a 
majority of outside directors on a large company, because it is nőt 
customary to appoint outside directors, and it is difficult to recruit 
an appropriate person as an outside director. Taking such circum- 
stances intő consideration, under the new alternative system, a 
company is obligated to organize three committees under the board 
of directors; i.e. audit committee, nominating committee and com- 
pensation committee.35 Those committees must consist of at least 
three members, and the majority of members in each committee 
must be outside directors who are nőt executive officers.36 Because 
one outside director may be appointed a member of two or three 
committees at the same time, two outside directors are sufficient to 
adopt the new altemative system. As there are no restrictions on the 
totál number of directors, the majority of the board of directors may 
be non-outside directors.
In order to solve the problem that outside directors are usually 
in the minority, the power of the nominating committee and the 
compensation committee are strengthened in comparison with si- 
milar committees in United States. Those committees are nőt 
authorized to determine and enforce nomination or compensation 
of directors in United States. Rather, nomination or compensation 
is decided by the board of directors. The Japanese nominating com- 
mitee and compensation committee are, however, authorized to 
decide those matters.37 Thus, committees are expected to work 
effectively in spite of the fact that outside directors are in the nume- 
rical minority.
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• Underthe new álternative system, functions of the execution of 
business affairs and the supervision of the execution thereof that are 
performed by the board of directors under the existing govemance 
system are, separated, and each function is performed by different 
organs. The organ.of executive officers is responsible fór the execu­
tion of business affairs under the fundamental management strate- 
gy decided upon by.the board of directors.38 Directors can nőt be 
engaged in the execution of business affairs.39 In addition to deci- 
sions on fundamental strategy, the board of directors is responsible 
fór supervision of the execution of such strategies by the executive 
officers.40 In particular, the board of directors is obligated to con- 
struct an effective internál control system-fór supervision of the 
executive officers.41 The audit committee performs audits to deter- 
mine whether the internál control system functions well.42 As an 
executive officer may at the same time be a director,43 top manage­
ment will usually hold the status of executive officer concurrently. 
His broad influence is expected to be supervised by the committees 
as above mentioned.
It seems doubtful that the'new altemative govemance system 
will be adopted by many large companies in the near fii tűre. At this 
point, less than one percent of all listed companies have expressed 
their intent to adopt the new system. Unless public companies, 
however, can nőt raise profitablity, the lack of initiative may possib- 
ly be found in the managepient under the existing, goverriance sys­
tem.
Although it is doubtful that there is a causal connection between 
a govemance and profits of a company, maintaining the existing sys­
tem may eventually become a symbol of incompetence and ineffi- 
ciency o f such company’s top management.
(3) L iab ilities o f  d irec tors a g a in s t a  com pany a n d  d e r iv a tiv e  
su its
With the 1950 amendment, the procedure fór fiiing derivative suits 
was imported from the American Corporation law. A stockholder 
who holds at least one stock can, on behalf of the company, britig 
suit against a director to claim damages fór loss incurred by the 
company as a result of the director’s dereliction of duties. If a direc-
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tor is found liable, the injured company itself should try to recover 
its loss from the liable director. Bút, generally speaking, the other 
directors or statutory auditors would nőt be keen to bring such a 
suit on behalf of the company. Therefore, the stockholder is entitled 
to bring suit in his name on behalf of the company. That action is so 
called the derivative suit. A stockholder, as a first step, has to 
request that the statutory auditor bring suit, bút unless the statuto­
ry auditor does nőt bring such suit within sixty days from the 
request, the requesting stockholder himself is entitled to bring
. 44suit.
After the import of the derivative suit procedure, there had been 
very few derivative suits until the 1990s. This pattern was explained 
by the fact that it is very difficult fór a plaintiff stockholder to get evi- 
dence proving a director’s liability, and that the court fee fór filing 
of a suit was very expensive.
At the beginning o f 1990s, the United States Government 
requested stronger protection of stockholders under Japanese com­
pany law. As a backdrop to this interest in investor protection, 
investments in stocks of Japanese companies by the American insti- 
tutional investors had been increasing. One of the requests was to 
make it easier fór stockholders to bring derivative suits. The 
Japanese govemment refused this requests, bút the Japanese legis- 
lature reduced the court fee fór a derivative suit drastically. On the 
other hand, after the end of the „bubble economy” of the laté 1980s, 
a lót of scandals at Japanese companies were exposed, and in somé 
cases, directors and employees were prosecuted. If prosecuted 
criminally, stockholders could easily get evidence fór derivative 
suits form the criminal procedure. From those reasons the deriva­
tive suits increased dramatically, and plaintiff stockholders were 
successfulin nőt a few cases.
Somé famous examples: A director of a large construction firm 
who committed bribery fór the purpose of accepting orders from 
the public sector was judged to be liable against the company. The 
amount o f damages was Yen 14 millión and that was that bribe 
offered by the company.45
Directors of a trading company who exported electronic instru- 
ments in violádon of the Law of Customs Duties and the Law on the
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Regulation of Foreign Exchange were judged to be liable against the 
company. The amount of damages was Yen 200 millión that consis- 
ted of the fine imposed on the company and the amount of losses 
caused by the purchase of instruments that could nőt be resold.46
The most famous case was that of Daiwa Bank in which somé 
defendant directors were ordered to pay Yen 80 billión as da­
mages.47 At the beginning of the case, it was revealed that an 
employee of the New York branch made dealings in U.S. treasury 
bonds without permisssion of the bank and he caused a loss of $11 
millión to the bank. The president and other senior directors were 
informed of this fact, bút did nőt urgently give notice of it to the U.S. 
bank supervision authorities, because they were afraid of a poten- 
tially adverse influence upon the financial markets. By this delay of 
notice, they violated U.S. bank regulations, and a fine of $ 3 millión 
was imposed upon the bank by the U.S. criminal court. Plaintiff 
stockholders claimed damages fór a loss from the trading loss and 
fine as mentioned above. Fór the trading loss, the court was in the 
opinion that the internál control system at the New York branch was 
nőt appropriate and, therefore, two directors who were responsible 
fór branch businesses were judged to be liable. Fór the loss caused 
by the fine imposed upon the bank, directors who neglected the 
notice in spite of the knowledge of the loss were judged to be liable. 
The totál amount of damages was about Yen 80 billión.
It is arguable, whether this judgment is reasonable or nőt. At the 
Court of Appeals, the parties reached a compromise, according to 
which the defendant directors paid several hundred millión yen to 
the bank. Bút this case had a serious influence on directors gene- 
rally. As in most cases in which plaintiff directors were judged to be 
liable, they participated intentionally or at least recklessly' in illegal 
activities, there were, theoretically, no way to defend them. 
However, there are nőt a few derivative suits in which plaintiffs 
claim damages fór losses that are caused by the simple misjudg- 
ments of directors in management. Certainly the idea that is similar 
to the so-called business judgment rule under the American law is 
supported by case law, the Japanese courts tend to test the reason- 
ableness o f the business judgments prudently in trial and a period 
of deliberation was required until the suits were dismissed.
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Therefore, being defendants in derivative suits; caries a heavy bur- 
den fór directors.
In derivative suits under Japanese law, a winning plaintiff stock- 
holder can claim reasonable compensation against the company.48 
That is calculated usually on the basis of reasonable lawyers fees. 
Bút active plaintiffs are, generaily speaking, stockholders or lawyers 
who are mainly interesting in the criticism of illegai activites or mis- 
management by directors. Therefore, compensation is nőt as strong 
an incentive fór them as in the case of derivative suits in United 
States.
It is well-known that the American Corporation law has weak- 
ened the threat o f derivative suits using somé legal tools-, i.e. the 
business judgment rule, the litigation committee of the board of 
directors that can dismiss derivative suits, and the limitation of 
directors’ liabilities by the articles of incorporation. Because in 
Japan derivative suits have been rare historically, the schemes that 
impose restraint on the excessive prosecution of the derivative suits 
have nőt been seriously considered, and it is nőt deniable that direc­
tors have been in a rather defenseless situation.
The issue o f whether directors should be protected from deriva­
tive suits has become a political matter. Somé members of 
Parliament are enthusiastic about the amendment of the 
Commercial Code concerning the weakening of the threat of deriva­
tive suits. In 2001, the Parliament passed the amendment that 
enables the limitation o f liabilites, accompanied by the amendment 
that strengthens the power of the statutory auditors fór auditory 
functions. According to the amendment, the generál meeting, or the 
board of directors if authorized by the articles of incorporation, can 
exempt the liabilities o f a director to the totál amount of his com­
pensation fór 4 years (6 years fór a representative director) from the 
company.49 Fór liabilities o f an outside director, a company can 
make an agreement with outside director that his liabilities are li­
mited to the totál amount o f his compansation fór two years.50 The 
exemption or limitation can nőt be effective if a director violated 
their duties intentionally or gross negligently.51 As liabilities of a 
non-outside director can be exempted after the court judges that he 
is liable, it seems difficult fór the board of directors to propose such
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exemption to the generál meeting or to decide exemption, because 
it may be afraid of criticism from stockholders. On the other hand, 
limitation of liabilities of an outside director is useful because an 
outside director can limit his liabilities in advance by contract upon 
his appointment. It would become easier fór outside directors can- 
didates to undertake the job without fearing huge liabilities.
4 Conclusion
The Japanese company law that started out as company law similar 
to that of continental-European countries has been transformed, 
since the end of the Second World War, intő an unique mixture of 
elements derived from European company law and the American 
company laws. By amendments in recent years, elements of the 
American company law were moreover imported such as the stock 
option, treasury stock, tracking stock, limited voting right stock etc. 
Alsó, the new altemative corporate governance system is influenced 
strongly by the American corporate governance model. However, it 
is usually necessary to transform such borrowed elements in order 
to incorporate them intő the Japanese company law system. With 
the transformation, the unique characteristics of Japanese company 
law have continuously broadened, although the fimdamental strüc- 
ture of company law does nőt differ from those in European count­
ries and the United States.
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NOTES
1 For a limited company Limited Companies 
Law was enacted in 1938.
2 Commercial Code art. 54, para. 1.
3 Commercial Code art. 168-4.
4 Law for Special Exceptions to the 
Commercial Code Conceming Audit, etc. of 
Stock Companies (This Law is cited as 
„Special Exceptions Law” inthe following 
parts) art. 1-2, para. 1.
5 Special Exceptions Law art. 2 -  art. 13.
6 Special Exceptions Law art. 1-2, para. 2.
7 Special Exceptions Law art. 25.
8 Commercial Code art. 204. para. 1.
9 Commercial Code art. 204-2 -  art. 204-5.
10 Commercial Code art. 280-5-2.
11 Commercial Code art. 210, para. 9-
12 Commercial Code art. 210, para. 2 and 
para. 7.
13 Commercial Code art. 221.
14 Commercial Code art. 222, para. l,.no. 5.
15 Commercial Code art. 222, para. 5.
16 Commercial Code art. 222, para. 1, no. 6 
and para. 7, art. 257-2 -  art. 257-6.
17 Commercial Code art. 222, para. 9.
18 Commercial Code art. 222-8 -  art. 22^-10.
19 Commercial Code art. 222, para. 3-
20 Commercial Code. art. 280-2, para. 1.
21 Commercial Code art. 347.
22 Commercial Code art. 188, para. 2, no. 6.
23 Commercial Code art. 280-2, para. 2.
24 Commercial Code art. 280-3-2.
25 Commercial Code art. 280-10.
26 Commercial Code art. 280-19.
27 Commercial Code art. 280-21.
28 Commercial Code art. 280-21.
29 Commercial Code art. 254, para. 1.
30 Commercial Code art. 261, para. 1.
31 Commercial Code art. 261, para. 1.
32 Commercial Code art. 280, para 1. an art. 
254, para. 1.
33 Commercial Code art. 74, para. 1, art. 281- 
2 and art. 281-3-
34 Special Exceptions Law art. 18-2.
35 Special Exceptions Law art. 2IM5, para. L 
Under the new alternative system, the 
organ of the statutory auditors is abolished. 
Special Exceptions Law art. 21-5, para. 2.
36 Special Exceptions b w  art. 21-8, para. 4.
37 Special Exceptions Law art. 21-8,para. 1 
and para. 3-
38 Special Exceptions Law art. 21-7 and art. 
21 - 12 .
39 Special Exceptions I.aw art. 21-6, para. 2.
40 Special Exceptions Law art. 21-7, para. 1.
41 Special Exceptions Law art. 21-7, para. 1, 
no. 2 that authorizes the Ministerial 
Ordinance to provide for the internál cont- 
rol system.
42 Special Exceptions Law art. 21-8, para. 2 
and art. 21-10.
43 Special Exceptions Law art. 21-13, para. 5. 
Bút directors belonging to the audit com- 
mittee cannot hold the status of executive 
officers or employees of the company and 
its subsidiaries concurrently. Special 
Exceptions Law art. 21-8, para. 7.
44 Commercial Code art. 267.
45 Judgment of Tokyo District Court, 
December 22, 1994, Hanrei Jiho No. 1518,
p з
46 Judgement of Tokyo District Court, June 
20, 1996, Hanrei Jiho No. 1572, p.27.
47 Judgement of Osaka District Court, 
September 20, 2000, Hanrei Jiho No. 1721, 
P 3-
48 Commercial Code art. 268-2..
49 Commercial Code art. 266, para. 7 -  para. 
18.
50 Commercial Code art. 266, para. 19 -para. 
23-
51 Commercial Code art. 266, para. 7, para. 
12 and para. 19.
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